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One of the outstanding women professional accountants, Miss
Palen is especially well qualified to present the vastly important sub
ject Postwar Reserves. A graduate of New York University and
C.P.A. (New York), her experience proves that even in the earlier
days barriers before the woman accountant were not insurmountable.
During the first World War, while still at New York University
majoring in accounting, she entered the employ of Haskins & Sells
and was sent out on audits. She testifies that even in those days
she encountered no opposition but only the most cordial treatment.
When the war ended the firm offered her the opportunity of be
coming a report reviewer. Reports of every type of organization
have come over her desk—railroads, steamship com panics, automo
bile manufacturers, public utilities, government agencies, oil com
panies, banks, brokerage houses, universities, birthday balls, African
safaris—and in what volume!
Her official rating is that of principal. In addition to AWSCPA,
she belongs to the American Institute of Accountants, New York
State Society of C.P.A.s and The Soroptimist Club and is an hon
orary member of Phi Chi Theta.
Miss Palen is also well known as an author, having to her credit
articles on accounting and two brochures, Grammatical Construction
and the Use of Words in Accountants’ Reports and Comments in
Accountants’ Reports, as well as a chapter on accountancy contrib
uted to Doris Fleischman’s An Outline of Careers for Women. Her
poetry, both serious and light, has appeared in The New York Sun,
Good Housekeeping and other widely known publications.

Postwar Reserves
JENNIE M. PALEN, C.P.A., New York, N. Y.

Four billion dollars is the amount which
American corporations paid to the public in
1943 in the form of dividends. A lot of money?
Note that it is two per cent less than was paid
in 1942 and ten per cent less than in 1941,
the last prewar year; and that in 1929, the
boom peacetime year, dividends paid amounted
to almost fifty per cent more than in 1943.
With plants operating at capacity all over
the country, some of them twenty-four hours
a day, why do dividends drop? As a glance at
almost any income statement will show, the
largest single factor in this decline is the in
crease in income taxes. Total corporate liabili
ties for income and excess-profits taxes have
climbed from slightly over one and one-quarter
billion dollars for 1937 to thirteen and onehalf billion dollars for 1943. And from what
is left after thirteen and one-half billions of
taxes, business is finding it necessary to with
hold vastly greater amounts than usual for
contingencies and for losses arising from cur
rent operations, against which, for tax or re
negotiation purposes, the government will not
allow the deduction of reserves.
In a survey made by its research depart
ment The American Institute of Accountants
found that, of the balance sheets contained in
551 published 1942 reports examined, 33 8 con

tained special reserves totaling $742,000,000
for losses or contingencies arising out of the
war.
These reserves were created for such pur
poses as reconversion of plant and facilities;
deferred maintenance and repairs; dismissal
compensation; inventories; and reestablishment
of postwar markets. While the word "con
tingencies” is frequently used in describing
them, it should be noted that these reserves
are not contingency reserves as that term is
generally understood, as all have been provided
to cover losses and expenses which are believed
to be certain to occur, the only uncertain fac
tor being the exact amount.
Probably the postwar business problem first
in the public consciousness at present is the
tremendous cost in both time and money of
conversion of war plants and facilities to peace
time production. Reconversion reserves there
fore head the list. In creating them considera
tion is being given not only to the cost of
converting back to peace but to the probability
that the change-over will have to be effected
at much higher prices than those prevailing
before the war. Some industries, notably the
automobile industry, to which reconversion is
a paramount problem, have also to consider
the possibility of obsolescence of some of their

[11]

prewar facilities.
Reconversion costs vary widely in different
companies and involve in some cases enforced
development of entirely new products and mar
kets because of inventions or processes which
came into being during the war.
Reserves for deferred maintenance and re
pairs arise from the necessity for uninterrupted
production and the difficulty or indeed impos
sibility of obtaining necessary replacement
parts, materials and labor. Intensive operation
and failure currently to maintain equipment
may also result in highly accelerated depreci
ation of the equipment, although this is usually
taken care of in the reserves for depreciation,
and has, to some extent, been recognized by
taxing authorities.
Professor Sumner H. Slichter estimates that
delayed maintenance in industry will amount
to two billion dollars or more by the middle
of 1944.
Reserves for dismissal compensation are be
coming more and more important in the public
mind each day. Their primary purpose is to
take care of severance pay of employees to be
released at the end of the war but they, or
similar reserves, must also cover the rehiring
of former employees returning from the armed
services and retention of wartime employees
during the unproductive transition period.
Special inventory reserves are considered
necessary because of probable future price de
clines, as indicated by the experience after
World War I; excessive stocks of basic ma
terials which may be held by war producers;
and obsolescence of armaments and of sub
stitute civilian products used during the war
period.
Losses from excessive stocks of materials
may, or may not in some cases, be taken care
of by termination settlements.
Doubtless no one will question the premise
that the cost of reconversion is a part of the
cost of producing war goods, since reconver
sion costs are incurred solely by reason of the
necessity for production of war materials. The
same reasoning applies to deferred maintenance
and repairs, dismissal compensation, and losses
on inventories at the end of the war. The estab
lishment of reserves for these purposes has re
ceived sanction from the most authoritative
sources, including the United States govern
ment.
The following is quoted from Accounting
Release No. 42, issued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission:
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"In view of the material effects which
war conditions may have on the results of
operations and the financial condition of
corporations, careful consideration must be
given to the need for establishing appro
priate reserves intended to provide for final
settlement of war production contracts, for
post-war readjustments, and for other pos
sible losses or adjustments resulting from
present conditions.”
The Committee on Accounting Procedure
of The American Institute of Accountants, in
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 13, says
with respect to war reserves:
"On the basis of experience in and after
the first world war and with the expectation
that there will be similar adjustments and
dislocations of business after the present war,
the utilitarian concept of accounting should
prompt accountants and others to encourage
the establishment of special reserves for costs
and losses arising out of the war.
"Recognition of the necessity of such
reserves is important, not only in the in
terests of the business enterprise, but in the
interest of the national economy as a whole.
The government might well take account of
this fact in its fiscal policies generally and
in respect of taxation. It would be wise on
the part of the government to give con
sideration to the recognition of provisions
of this kind as deductions in the determi
nation of taxable income, subject to neces
sary safeguards in regard to the ultimate dis
position thereof. Such a policy would tend
to make taxable income more nearly reflect
real income, since these reserves are intended
to give recognition to costs and losses re
lated to the war period which are real,
though in many cases they cannot now be
definitely measured.”
Mr. Maurice Karker, chairman of the War
Department’s Price Adjustment Board, is
quoted as saying:
“As far as I know, no member of the
price adjustment boards has expressed any
opposition to postwar reserves, but any cre
ation of such reserves is a responsibility
which must rest with Congress.”
The attitude of the Treasury Department
is that some need for relief exists but that it
must disallow deduction for any part of these
costs prior to their expenditure, on the ground
that no adequate means of measuring the neces
sary reserves have been devised.
In an address before the 1943 annual meet

ing of The American Institute of Accountants,
Mr. Randolph E. Paul, General Counsel for
the Treasury Department, made the following
statements:
"To this audience I think I may dog
matically state that reconversion costs, in
the sense of costs directly associated with
the earning of wartime income, should be
charged against that income . . .
"Of course, the cost of dismantling and
scrapping facilities amortized under certifi
cates of necessity are war costs . . .
"The costs of returning plants to their
prewar condition and dismissal wages do not
exhaust the possible postwar costs which
might be included under the heading of
reconversion.”
Later in the same address Mr. Paul stated:
"... the deduction from wartime income
of unrelated postwar expenditures would be
nothing more than a subsidy program . . .
"I am sure that the major part of our
business leadership does not believe that after
four consecutive years of industrial pros
perity government subsidies in the guise of
postwar reserves are either necessary or wise.”
Note that Mr. Paul says, "deduction of
unrelated postwar expenditures.” Relief does
not require that reserves for unrelated expendi
tures be allowed, but only such reserves as the
government itself has acknowledged to be re
lated to wartime income.
Taxes, says industry, are being paid at the
highest rates in history upon income fictitiously
inflated by government’s failure to recognize
just and proper costs. Allowance of these ex
penditures when they are incurred in the post
war period will not furnish industry with the
funds needed to survive until the tax benefit
is realized. Neither the carry-back of losses and
unused excess-profits tax credits nor the post
war refund, both added to the law as relief
measures, will help the taxpayer who collapses
in trying to get back to a peacetime basis.
Computation of reasonable amounts for war
reserves is not an insuperable difficulty. Busi
ness is planning ahead for reconversion and in
many cases plans have matured to a point
where at least minimum costs can be foretold.
Reserves for deferred maintenance and re
pairs are probably subject to measurement with
more accuracy than some of the other war re
serves. Engineering surveys of the physical
condition of the equipment may be used to
substantiate the need for the reserve. Other

proposed means of computing the amounts re
quired make use of past ratios of maintenance
and repairs to operating costs per hour, mile,
ton, etc., adjusted for changes in price level,
volume, and other factors.
Professor W. Arnold Hosmer has outlined
a plan in which he suggests that a reserve for
deferred maintenance and repairs in any reason
able amount be allowed as an expense on the
following conditions: (1) that the company
fund the reserve at once in United States gov
ernment bonds and carry these bonds until they
are sold to provide for maintenance expendi
tures; (2) that all charges to the reserve shall
be for maintenance; and (3) that any balance
remaining in the reserve be returned to in
come for purposes of taxation not later than
five years after the termination of the war.
As to reserves for dismissal compensation,
it is believed that a reasonably accurate pro
vision for such a reserve might be based upon
payroll statistics of present and prewar levels
of employment and wage rates, considered
policies as to dismissal compensation, and de
termination of the total number of employees
who must be retained to keep the organization
intact during reconversion.
Suggestions have been made that current
provisions be based upon a fixed percentage of
payrolls or that the reserve provided be an
amount somewhere between the lowest and
highest amounts which the company may be
required to pay out for these purposes.
Nor are inventory reserves a stumbling
block. Industry has had long experience with
methods of computing inventory valuations on
a realizable basis. It should be able to produce
some acceptable and consistent procedure, based
upon the difference between current prices and
prices at some accepted basic date, of com
puting reserves necessary to reduce inventories
periodically to a valuation recoverable under
postwar conditions.
The weakness in industry’s past procedure
lies in the fact that the provisions made for
reserves have had inadequate relation to facts.
Too often they have been lump-sum appro
priations governed by whim, by guess, or by
profits available for the purpose. It is under
standable that taxing authorities and price ad
justment boards refuse to allow deductions
thoughtlessly calculated. But where the re
serves are, and in most cases they can be, based
upon carefully considered plans, engineering
surveys, price schedules, or other sound con
siderations, it is difficult to understand why a
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reasonable provisional charge should not be
allowed against wartime operations.
The Treasury’s practice of recognizing ex
penses and loses for tax purposes only when
they are actually incurred and determinable
has already some exceptions, as in the case
of both ordinary and accelerated depreciation.
Why should not the principles covering these
items apply also to costs admitted by the Treas
ury to be applicable to war years, if a reason
able basis of computation can be found?
Determination of this basis, to be sure
involves difficulties, but if industry can over
come the difficulties of changing over to allout war production with results that break all
records, surely it is not too much to ask that
a formula be found for accounting for these
costs against current income.
Variations on the plan offered by Profes
sor Hosmer have been suggested which would
require than an over-all deduction be allowed
for all postwar reserves in an amount not to
exceed a fixed percentage of net income, such
deduction to be elective by the taxpayer; and
stipulating that any unused balances in the re
serves three years after the war ends be subject
to recapture by the Treasury by taxing them
at the rates in effect when the funds were
created.
This plan has much to recommend it be
sides its simplicity. One of its most practical
features is the requirement that the reserve be
invested in government bonds, thereby furnish
ing the government with immediate funds in
excess of what the taxes would have been, and
at the same time providing postwar funds for
the taxpayer.
The need for cash in the postwar period
will be so tremendous that unless plans for
providing it are evolved now many businesses
will be unable to survive.
The establishment of postwar reserves does
not of itself provide the funds with which to
meet the expenditures. Heavy taxes, heavy
payrolls, heavy material purchases drain away
surplus cash and leave reserve accounts invested
in plant and other non-liquid assets.
In normal times, with certain exceptions,
it is not the usual procedure to fund reserves.
Almost any prosperous concern can in peace
time make more money through the use of
cash in the business than a fund would return
in the way of profit. A prosperous concern
would therefore reasonably expect to have on
hand sufficient funds for required replacements
or other expenditures.
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Under present conditions the reasonable ex
pectation is for such a dearth of cash that con
servative managements will think seriously
about funding their reserves for reconversion
severance compensation, deferred maintenance
and other postwar purposes.
During these war years many corporations
have funded their tax liabilities, which are cur
rent obligations rather than reserves, in whole
or in part by purchasing tax anticipation notes
or government securities. In some instances the
tax liability is expressed in the balance sheet
by showing the accrual, deducting the tax
anticipation notes, and extending the net
amount. Such treatment has the sanction of
The American Institute of Accountants.
There is growing evidence of accumulation
of funds to discharge the obligations inherent
in postwar reserves, and of forethought regard
ing credit needs.
The Wall Street Journal of January 15 an
nounced a modernization and expansion pro
gram to be undertaken by five automobile
companies—General Motors, Chrysler, Stude
baker, Packard and Nash-Kelvinator—which
will involve a cash outlay of one billion one
hundred million dollars. This announcement
may be taken as an indication of the extent
of the demand for cash in the rush of industry
to establish a competitive position in the post
war world as rapidly as possible.
In its Accounting Research Bulletin No.
13, previously mentioned, The American In
stitute of Accountants has outlined its standards
for the treatment in the accounts of special
reserves arising out of the war.
In general, the procedure recommended is
that provisions be made in the current income
statement, by charges, properly classified, for
all foreseeable costs and losses applicable against
current revenues, to the extent that they can
be measured and allocated to fiscal periods with
reasonable approximation. Charges should be
made against the reserves and any unused bal
ances remaining in the reserves should be taken
into the income statement as a separate item
after operating profits, or, in exceptional cases,
as a credit to earned surplus.
Where the reserves are created for possible
costs and losses (other than the foregoing)
the amount of which is not presently de
terminable, the committee suggests that the
provision be shown in the income statement as
a deduction from income for the period com
puted on the usual basis. When the costs and
losses are later determined they should ordi

narily be shown in the income statement ac
cording to the usual rules of classification, and
an equivalent amount of the reserve shown as
an extraordinary credit. Any unrequired bal
ances in the reserves should be transferred to
earned surplus.
The committee comments that some re
serves may fall in part in each group and
cautions that doubts as to the proper classifi
cation of reserves should be resolved in favor
of inclusion in the first group.
Where reserves of the second group are
relatively large the committee recognizes that
it may be undesirable to use the term "net in
come” in describing any figure in the income
statement of either the period in which the
reserves are made or the period in which the
costs or losses are ascertained and brought into
account.
This may be accomplished in the period in
which the reserves are created by (a) arriving
at a balance of income remaining after pro
viding for all reasonably determinable costs
and losses (reserves of the first group); (b) de
ducting from such balance provisions for the
reserves of the second group; and (c) describ
ing the remainder as "income transferred to
earned surplus.”
In the period in which the costs or losses
are determined and brought into account the
recommended procedure is to (d) prepare the
income statement to show the balance of in
come remaining after providing for all reason
ably determinable costs and losses of the period
then current; (e) show as separate charges in
the income statement those items related to
prior periods for which provision was made in
(b) above; (f) show, as a credit in the in
come statement, a transfer from the reserves
created under (b) to the extent that they have
been applied against the items in (e); and
(g) describe the remainder as "income trans
ferred to earned surplus.”
The committee then restates the longestablished principle that it is not permissible
to create reserves for the purpose of equalizing
reported income. Reserves for the purpose of
dividend equalization may be provided only by
charges against earned surplus; no charges may
be made thereagainst except for dividends or
for transfers back to earned surplus.
Publication of this bulletin by the Institute
early in 1942 indicates that from the outset
of the war the accounting profession has been
concerned about the effect of postwar costs
and losses on wartime income.

In this, government, business, and the ac
counting profession can have but a single aim—
to maintain our industrial structure in such
health and vigor as will enable it to meet its
war production goals, and to leave it in physical
condition to take up the problems of producing
for peace.
Tax News—Continued from Page Eight
The changes in Retailers Excise Taxes in
cluded in the pending 1943 Revenue Bill will
bring the conscientious efficient retailer a new
set of problems. Part of his merchandise is
subject to a 20% tax, part to a 15% tax, the
balance of his stock subject to no tax. There
are new exceptions to the tax and new in
clusions. This must be taught to the poorest
quality of personnel that he has had since he
has been in business. If the tax is not collected
from the consumer, it must be paid by the re
tailer, and 20% or 15% off dollar volume on
many sales in these days of close operating
margins can change a black operating figure
to a red one in short order. From the retailer
that faces his new problems and adjusts to
meet them, the government will collect Re
tailers Excise taxes. The taxes that this type
of retailer pays may pay the expense of keep
ing collectors in the field to collect from others
that do not know or understand the law. Those
retailers that are here today and gone tomor
row, those people who should never have been
in business at any time, we always have in
every village, town and city of the land. Those
people fade quietly from the picture, leaving
no assets, only unpaid bills to wholesalers, un
paid sales tax, income tax, excise tax, and no
records on which to base a claim in the event
they are found.
Luxury items should provide additional
revenue for the government, both in peace and
war time. Furs and jewelry are at no time
essential to our well being. Those are things
that we buy either to give pleasure to ourselves
or to some one dear to us. When in the mood
to buy a beautiful fur or just the right piece
of jewelry, a mere 10% or 20% tax included
in the purchase price would not stop us. Such
a levy is the only truly painless tax there is.
The government should collect the tax, but
collect it on an economically sound basis, at
source, from the manufacturer. The Treasury
could collect with less expense. The retailer
could devote the time spent in collecting taxes
to merchandising at a profit, part of which
he would pay in income taxes.
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